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THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT 
AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF 
MEDICAL IMPAIRMENT PANELS:  
ARE THE TWO SAFELY COMPATIBLE? 
Robert E. Gilbert* 
INTRODUCTION 
The history of the American presidency has been replete with instances of 
serious physiological illnesses in Presidents.  The list of Presidents who 
suffered such illnesses includes Washington, Adams, Madison, Monroe, 
Jackson, W.H. Harrison, Taylor, Lincoln, Garfield, Arthur, Cleveland, 
McKinley, Wilson, Harding, F.D. Roosevelt, Eisenhower, Kennedy, 
Johnson, Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Clinton.1  Collectively, these 
Presidents suffered such medical problems as heart attacks, strokes, cancer, 
hemorrhages, pneumonia, convulsions, bullet wounds, gangrene, Addison’s 
disease, Bright’s disease, malaria, atrial fibrillation, alcoholism, scarlet fever, 
smallpox, infections, excruciating headaches, hypertension, ileitis, tremors, 
gallbladder disease, prostate disease, hyperthyroidism, torn ligaments, and 
delirium.2 
In addition to such physiological ailments, Presidents have likely suffered 
from psychological illness as well.  Calvin Coolidge is quite likely an 
example of a President who has suffered such affliction.  After his sixteen-
year-old son died in July 1924 of blood poisoning, as a result of raising a 
blister on his toe while playing tennis, Coolidge blamed himself for the death, 
saying to visitors, “if I had not been President he would not have raised a 
blister on his toe, which resulted in blood poisoning, playing lawn tennis in 
the [White House] south grounds.”3  In the period after his son’s death, 
President Coolidge seemed to have suffered from an unrelenting clinical 
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 1. For a broad discussion of presidential illness throughout U.S. history, see RUDOLPH 
MARX, THE HEALTH OF THE PRESIDENTS (1960). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Unusual Political Career of Calvin Coolidge, Never Defeated for an Office, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 6, 1933), http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/bday/0704.html 
[https://perma.cc/WR3L-79DX]; see also ROBERT SOBEL, COOLIDGE:  AN AMERICAN ENIGMA 
295–99 (1998). 
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depression.4  The Physician to the President at the time described him as 
having “temperamental derangement” and an aide described him as showing 
signs of “mental illness,” but no one in or outside the White House realized 
that Coolidge was psychologically ill and would never fully recover.5  For 
the country, the President’s condition was disastrous as economic storm 
clouds were gathering that would soon develop into the Great Depression.  
Coolidge’s presidency and his life were simply destroyed by unrelenting 
grief.  In his 1929 autobiography, Coolidge wrote all too truly:  “In his 
suffering he was asking me to make him well.  I could not.  When he went, 
the power and glory of the Presidency went with him.”6 
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment was added to the Constitution, after years 
of effort, in 1967, to resolve instances of debilitating illnesses of all kinds.  
The Amendment’s four sections deal with:  (1) vice presidential succession 
to the presidency; (2) replacement of the Vice President when that office 
becomes vacant; (3) voluntary withdrawal of the President from office and 
his or her replacement by the Vice President who becomes Acting President; 
and (4) involuntary replacement of the President by the Vice President who 
becomes Acting President. 
I.  TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT 
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment has four sections, each of substantial 
importance. 
SECTION 1.  In case of the removal of the President from office or his 
death or resignation, the Vice President shall become President. 
SECTION 2.  Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice 
President, the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take 
office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress. 
SECTION 3.  Whenever the President transmits to the President pro 
tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his 
written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of 
his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the 
contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President 
as Acting President. 
SECTION 4.  Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the 
principal officers of the executive departments or of such other body as 
Congress may by law provide, transmit to the President pro tempore of the 
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written 
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties 
of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and 
duties of the office as Acting President. 
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore of 
the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written 
 
 4. ROBERT E. GILBERT, THE TORMENTED PRESIDENT:  CALVIN COOLIDGE, DEATH, AND 
CLINICAL DEPRESSION 147–74, 219–21 (2003). 
 5. Id. at 221, 255. 
 6. CALVIN COOLIDGE, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF CALVIN COOLIDGE 190 (1931). 
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declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties 
of his office unless the Vice President and a majority of either the principal 
officers of the executive department or of such other body as Congress may 
by law provide, transmit within four days to the President pro tempore of 
the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written 
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties 
of his office.  Thereupon Congress shall decide the issue, assembling within 
forty-eight hours for that purpose if not in session.  If the Congress, within 
twenty-one days after receipt of the latter written declaration, or, if 
Congress is not in session, within twenty-one days after Congress is 
required to assemble, determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the 
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice 
President shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; 
otherwise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office.7 
After the Amendment was added to the Constitution, it demonstrated its 
usefulness very quickly.  Section 1 was invoked for the first time on August 
9, 1974, only seven years after its enactment, when Richard Nixon resigned 
the office of the presidency under threat of impeachment as a result of the 
Watergate scandal.8  He was immediately replaced by Vice President Gerald 
Ford who became, under the terms of Section 1 of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment, President of the United States.  No longer was there doubt that 
the Vice President became President rather than Acting President whenever 
the President permanently vacated the office.  By writing in the Constitution 
that the Vice President inherits the “powers and duties” of the presidential 
office rather than the office itself, the Constitution’s framers seemed to imply 
a preference for an “Acting President” designation in instances of presidential 
transition.9  However, the 1967 Amendment decided otherwise. 
Section 2 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment was invoked for the first time 
in October 1973, when President Nixon nominated Michigan Congressman 
and Republican House Minority Leader Gerald Ford to be the nation’s new 
Vice President after incumbent Vice President Spiro Agnew was compelled 
to resign his office.10  Agnew’s resignation came about as part of a plea 
bargain that resulted from the embarrassing—and illegal—financial dealings 
in which he was involved while serving as Baltimore County Executive and 
afterward as Governor of Maryland.11  After initially denying any 
wrongdoing, Agnew finally pled no contest to the felony of tax evasion for 
the year 1967 and resigned the vice presidency.12  His plea was accepted and, 
as punishment, he was fined $10,000 and placed on probation for three 
years.13  Had Agnew not resigned the vice presidency, he likely would have 
 
 7. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV. 
 8. JOHN D. FEERICK, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT:  ITS COMPLETE HISTORY AND 
APPLICATIONS 158–66 (3d ed. 2014). 
 9. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4. 
 10. FEERICK, supra note 8, at 138. 
 11. Id. at 125–34.  
 12. Id.  In other words, Agnew had failed to pay taxes on the illegal payments he had 
received as a political leader in Maryland. 
 13. Id. at 133. 
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been indicted and quite possibly sent to prison since strong evidence existed 
that “he was guilty of bribery and extortion as well as simple tax evasion.”14 
After the House and Senate approved Ford’s nomination fifty-four days 
later (387 to 35 in the House; 92 to 3 in the Senate), the former Congressman 
took the oath as the nation’s new Vice President.15  After Ford succeeded 
Nixon as President in August 1974, he nominated former New York 
Governor Nelson Rockefeller to be his Vice President.16  Given Rockefeller’s 
liberal tendencies, his nomination upset many conservative Republicans.17  
One factor that angered both liberals and conservatives was that Rockefeller 
had given financial “gifts” totaling almost $2 million to a number of public 
officials so that they would remain in public office rather than return to a 
more lucrative career in the private sector.18  To some, these gifts smacked 
of influence peddling.19  After an acrimonious debate and a lengthy delay of 
121 days, Rockefeller’s nomination was finally approved by Congress (287 
to 128 in the House; 90 to 7 in the Senate).20  If the Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
had not then been part of the Constitution, the vice presidency would have 
been vacant from the moment of Nixon’s resignation on August 9, 1974, until 
January 20, 1977, when former Minnesota Senator Walter Mondale took the 
oath of office as Jimmy Carter’s Vice President. 
Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, the first of the disability 
provisions, has been invoked three times in the nation’s past.  The first 
occurred in 1985 when President Ronald Reagan, in the hospital and about 
to undergo cancer surgery, signed a letter designating Vice President George 
Bush as Acting President of the United States.21  Some nine hours later, 
Reagan signed a second letter—this time reclaiming his powers and duties as 
President.22  Ironically, if Reagan had delayed his resumption of presidential 
powers and duties until his recovery was further advanced, he might have 
escaped his embarrassing involvement in the devastating Iran-Contra scandal 
that was “finalized” shortly after his surgery took place.23 
Section 3 was also invoked in 2002 and 2007 by President George W. Bush 
just prior to undergoing colonoscopies while under anesthesia.24  In each 
instance, Vice President Dick Cheney served as Acting President for very 
brief periods of time.25  Section 3 should have been, but was not, invoked in 
 
 14. RICHARD M. COHEN & JULES WITCOVER, A HEARTBEAT AWAY:  THE INVESTIGATION 
AND RESIGNATION OF VICE PRESIDENT SPIRO T. AGNEW 361 (1974). 
 15. FEERICK, supra note 8, at 148, 156. 
 16. Id. at 169. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 173–77. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 186. 
 21. Robert E. Gilbert, The Politics of Presidential Illness:  Ronald Reagan and the Iran-
Contra Scandal, POL. & LIFE SCI., Fall 2014, at 58, 58–59. 
 22. Id. at 60. 
 23. Id. at 61. 
 24. Peter Baker, Bush Will Temporarily Hand Reins to Cheney, WASH. POST (July 21, 
2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/20/AR20070720017 
90.html [https://perma.cc/E9PL-AWYS].  
 25. Id. 
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1981 by President Reagan after he was shot and seriously injured by 
attempted assassin John Hinckley.  This was most unfortunate because 
Reagan was severely incapacitated as a result of having been shot and would 
likely have been unable to respond to any crises that confronted him soon 
after that event.26 
Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment is the only section that has not 
yet been utilized.  It conjures up the unpleasant specter of involuntary 
separation of the President from the powers and duties of the office by 
cooperative action of the Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet.  
Apparently, Ronald Reagan’s Chief of Staff briefly considered invoking 
Section 4 late in Reagan’s second term when the President appeared to be 
rather disengaged from the work of his administration.27  But, as will be 
discussed later in this Article, the decision was made not to invoke it. 
II.  PROPOSALS FOR A MEDICAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
At least two proposals have been offered by prominent members of the 
medical community to establish “Medical Impairment Panels” to monitor the 
health of Presidents of the United States and to facilitate the implementation 
of relevant Sections of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.  The first to be 
discussed here was made by Dr. Herbert Abrams, a now deceased professor 
of radiology at Stanford University;28 the second by Dr. Bert Park, a 
prominent Missouri neurosurgeon.29  Dr. Abrams and Dr. Park spoke and 
wrote about their plans frequently over the years.  The objective of each 
proposal was to ensure that the Vice President, the Cabinet, and Congress are 
informed as to situations when a President might be seriously impaired in 
terms of carrying out his or her official responsibilities as President of the 
United States.  Each proposal will be assessed here in turn. 
A.  The Abrams Plan 
In 1995, Dr. Abrams proposed a committee system that would effectively 
result in a “Medical Impairment Panel.”30  The committee would be 
established “either by statute or by concurrent resolution . . . that ensures the 
vice president, the Cabinet and the public of objective, independent, and 
accurate assessments of the president’s health.”31  Further, Abrams suggested 
that this committee should “consist of two internists, two neurologists, a 
 
 26. See DEL QUENTIN WILBER, RAWHIDE DOWN:  THE NEAR ASSASSINATION OF RONALD 
REAGAN 190–91, 200 (2011). 
 27. Gilbert, supra note 21, at 69. 
 28. Herbert L. Abrams, Can the Twenty-Fifth Amendment Deal with a Disabled 
President?  Preventing Future White House Cover-Ups, 29 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 115, 115 
(1999). 
 29. See DISABILITY IN U.S. PRESIDENTS:  REPORT, RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
COMMENTARIES BY THE WORKING GROUP 33 (James F. Toole et al. eds., 1997). 
 30. Abrams, supra note 28, at 118.  This Article uses the term “Medical Impairment 
Panel” to refer to a group of physicians tasked with overseeing the President’s health and 
advising on issues of presidential inability suggested by Abrams and others. 
 31. Id. 
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psychiatrist, and a surgeon.”32  These doctors would participate in an “annual 
review of pertinent history, systems, physical examination, and laboratory 
data on the president . . . together with the president’s physician.”33  The 
committee would include “a reasonable mix of Democrats and Republicans 
to avoid the taint of partisanship, and its composition would be subject to the 
approval of the secretary of Health and Human Services.”34  Abrams did not 
attempt to specify what he meant by the words “reasonable mix.”  A 5-1 
division between Democrats and Republicans seems quite unreasonable for 
such a sensitive and powerful body; would a 4-2 division represent a 
reasonable partisan “mix”? 
Dr. Abrams did not describe what the process of approval by the Secretary 
of Health and Human Services might entail.  Certain, of course, is that his 
proposal—if ultimately put into effect—all but guarantees that the Secretary 
of Health and Human Services would always be appointed primarily for 
reasons of staunch partisan loyalty to the President rather than for 
professional competence in his or her field of expertise.  Whether this is 
appropriate or wise is unclear. 
According to Abrams, a second—and very important—role this group of 
physicians would play is “the medical evaluation of the president whenever 
the question of disability arose.”35  The committee on which they would serve 
would convene immediately after being informed by the Physician to the 
President or the Vice President that the President’s physical or mental 
condition needed to be reviewed.36  After completing its assessment, the 
medical committee would “convey to the president and vice president the 
presence or absence of a state of impairment requiring consideration of 
invocation of the Twenty-fifth Amendment” and would make disclosure to 
the public of “[s]ignificant findings.”37 
Despite the benign intent of this recommendation, it presents highly 
complex problems.  First, Abrams pointed out that because the role of an 
independent body of experts would be to examine the President but not to 
deliver medical care, “they would not have the same professional obligations 
with regard to confidentiality as would his personal physician.”38  Even 
assuming this view is correct, the violation of the principle of medical 
confidentiality in the case of the President of the United States would likely 
have devastating effects both at home and abroad by injecting into the public 
domain medical information that should be kept private.  Abrams’s proposal, 
then, would be damaging to the ability of Presidents to inspire confidence 
and provide leadership. 
In this important respect, the writings of political scientist Richard 
Neustadt are useful to consider.  In his seminal book, which is still in print 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 122. 
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today almost sixty years after its initial publication in 1960, Neustadt focused 
his attention not on the topic of presidential powers but rather on the 
“concept” of presidential power.39  The two are quite different from each 
other and it is important to understand the difference.  Presidential powers 
are the constitutional powers specifically exercised by the President.  For 
example, the President is Commander in Chief of U.S. military forces, can 
veto legislation, and can appoint individuals to various offices.40  Presidential 
power, however, is of another nature and perhaps more difficult to 
understand.  Neustadt writes of the enormous importance of the President’s 
“professional reputation.”  He explains: 
A President’s persuasiveness with others in the government depends on 
something more than his advantages for bargaining.  [Those] he would 
persuade must be convinced in their own minds that he has skill and will 
enough to use his advantages.  Their judgment of him is a factor in his 
influence with them. . . . 
[Those] who share in governing this country are inveterate observers of 
a President.  They have the doing of whatever he wants done.  They are the 
objects of his personal persuasion.  They also are the most attentive 
members of his audience.  These doers comprise what in spirit, not 
geography, might well be termed the “Washington community.”  This 
community cuts across the President’s constituencies.  Members of 
Congress and of his Administration, governors of states, military 
commanders in the field, leading politicians in both parties, representatives 
of private organizations, newsmen of assorted types and sizes, foreign 
diplomats (and principals abroad)—all these are “Washingtonians” no 
matter what their physical location. . . .  By definition all its members are 
compelled to watch the President for reasons not of pleasure but vocation.  
They need him in their business just as he needs them. . . . 
. . . A President’s effect on them is heightened or diminished by their 
thoughts about his probable reaction to their doing.  They base their 
expectations on what they can see of him.  And they are watching all the 
time. . . . 
. . . . 
A President who values power . . . has every reason for concern with the 
residual impressions of tenacity and skill accumulating in the minds of 
Washingtonians-at-large.  His bargaining advantages in seeking what he 
wants are heightened or diminished by what others think of him.  Their 
thoughts are shaped by what they see.  They do not see alone, they see 
together.  What they think of him is likely to be much affected by the things 
they see alike.  His look in “everybody’s” eyes becomes strategically 
important for his influence.  Reputation, of itself, does not persuade, but it 
can make persuasion easier, or harder, or impossible.41 
 
 39. See generally RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN 
PRESIDENTS (The Free Press rev. ed. 1990) (1960). 
 40. U.S. CONST. art. II. 
 41. NEUSTADT, supra note 39, at 50–54. 
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Neustadt argues, then, that the President’s professional reputation (what 
other political leaders at home and abroad think of his political skillfulness) 
is important to his persuasive abilities and that he must do all he can to protect 
that reputation.42  He must truly understand that his leadership must be both 
steady and disciplined and that he must be seen as being “in control” of 
himself and his administration.  In his official duties, words are important 
and he must always say what he means and must always mean what he says.  
His words and his policies must always be in sync and must reinforce each 
other.  He must certainly strive to avoid errors in describing his policies and 
must be clear and steady in stating his administration’s intentions.  
Presidential power depends, in part, on the ability of Presidents to protect 
their professional reputations since those reputations are essential to the art 
of governance. 
In this respect, then, any public announcement of the President’s alleged 
ailments by members of an Medical Impairment Panel would surely 
undermine his overall professional reputation and make it much more 
difficult for him to lead or, in other words, to exert influence.  This is hardly 
an objective that should be sought after—except, of course, by enemies and 
competitors of the United States on the world stage and by the President’s 
political enemies at home.  What benefits, for example, would a public airing 
of Franklin Roosevelt’s ailments have brought to him and to the United States 
during World War II, a time when the country needed a strong leader as well 
as popular reassurance and determination?  Would it have enhanced or 
diminished Roosevelt’s professional reputation and the nation’s war efforts?  
Would it have enhanced or diminished his popular standing?  At what price 
to the President and to the country? 
By the same logic, what benefits would public scrutiny of Dwight 
Eisenhower’s ileitis surgery in 1956 have brought to him personally and to 
the war in the Middle East that at the time he was struggling to bring to an 
end?43  A competent surgeon suggested privately to Eisenhower’s intimates 
that the “chances are six or eight to one against a man of Eisenhower’s age 
recovering from an ileitis operation.”44  However, as we now know, 
Eisenhower did indeed recover.  If the content of the surgeon’s opinion had 
been publicized at home and abroad, would Eisenhower’s “power” have held 
steady, or would it have sharply declined?  Would full disclosure in either of 
these instances have produced desirable results for the President in office at 
the time or for the nation?  Or would it more likely have produced confusion, 
upset, and political turmoil?  To most observers, the answer is clear. 
Dr. Abrams further accentuated this problem when he suggested that the 
committee “would have nothing to gain by withholding information from the 
public.”45  In the case of the President of the United States, this is, once again, 
 
 42. Id. 
 43. DAVID A. NICHOLS, EISENHOWER 1956:  THE PRESIDENT’S YEAR OF CRISIS—SUEZ AND 
THE BRINK OF WAR 284–86 (2011). 
 44. ROBERT E. GILBERT, THE MORTAL PRESIDENCY:  ILLNESS AND ANGUISH IN THE WHITE 
HOUSE 102 (2d ed. 1998) (footnote omitted).  
 45. Abrams, supra note 28, at 122. 
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hardly a sensible notion.  Does the public in the United States and abroad 
deserve to know everything about the President’s state of health?  Does not 
the President have privacy rights, as all other Americans do?  Might not—
indeed should not—some information be properly withheld from the public 
domain?  Should, for example, the discovery of an aneurism in Eisenhower’s 
heart by his cardiologist, Dr. Thomas Mattingly, in 1955 have been 
announced immediately or soon after to the world?  Such an announcement 
may not have been correctly understood by either the public or by world 
leaders and almost certainly would have diminished Eisenhower’s ability to 
lead at home and abroad.  It also may well have prevented him from running 
for reelection in 1956 and, rather unfairly, from winning that election if he 
did run. 
Eisenhower’s autopsy, conducted almost nine years after he left office, 
revealed that the aneurysm did indeed exist for at least thirteen years and 
likely much longer but that it had not ruptured during the remainder of his 
lifetime.46  In fact, after surmounting his 1955 cardiac problems, Eisenhower 
lived for fourteen more years until he died in March 1969 at the age of 78.  
Ironically, the former President outlived his opponent in the 1956 presidential 
election, Adlai Stevenson, and Stevenson’s running mate, Estes Kefauver, by 
several years.47  This was doubly ironic in light of the fact that Stevenson had 
given a rather tasteless televised address during the 1956 campaign in which 
he warned: 
I must say bluntly that every piece of scientific evidence we have, every 
lesson of history and experience, indicates that a Republican victory 
tomorrow would mean that Richard M. Nixon would probably be President 
of this country within the next four years. 
. . . . 
I say frankly, . . . as a citizen more than candidate, that I recoil at the 
prospect of Mr. Nixon as a custodian of this nation’s future, as guardian of 
the hydrogen bomb, as representative of America in the world, as 
Commander in Chief of the United States armed forces. 
. . . . 
Your choice tomorrow will not be of a President for tomorrow.  It will 
be of the man—or men—who will serve you as President for the next four 
years.48 
In supporting his proposal, Abrams complained that “White House 
physicians have shown a strong propensity for masking presidential 
illness.”49  In this regard, he cited Cary Grayson, Woodrow Wilson’s 
Physician to the President, who in 1918 “helped orchestrate the cover-up of 
 
 46. Robert E. Gilbert, Eisenhower’s 1955 Heart Attack:  Medical Treatment, Political 
Effects, and the “Behind the Scenes” Leadership Style, POL. & LIFE SCI., Mar. 2008, at 2, 5–
6. 
 47. Id. at 12–15. 
 48. Harrison E. Salisbury, Democrat Ends Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1956, at 1, 39. 
 49. Abrams, supra note 28, at 122. 
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Wilson’s massive stroke under the direction of Wilson’s wife.”50  While this 
assertion about Grayson might well be accurate,51 other—and far more 
recent—Physicians to the President have behaved quite differently and would 
seem wholly undeserving of such criticism.  For example, in 1981, Physician 
to the President Dr. Daniel Ruge was convinced that Ronald Reagan should 
surely invoke the Twenty-Fifth Amendment after being shot and severely 
wounded by John Hinckley, but Reagan’s “political” aides decided 
otherwise.52  Also, Dr. John Hutton, Physician to the President to Ronald 
Reagan during Reagan’s second term, believed that it was absurd for Reagan 
to resume his powers and duties in 1985 only nine hours after undergoing 
extensive cancer surgery.53  But Reagan did resume them—with very 
unfortunate results to himself and the country.  More specifically, it now 
appears that Reagan, while recuperating in the hospital, gave “final approval” 
to a controversial policy of arms sales to Iran that backfired badly and 
produced humiliation for the President and his entire administration.54 
Also, during the Clinton administration, invocation of Section 3 of the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment arose once as a real possibility.  This was when 
the President fell while in Florida in March 1997 and badly injured his 
quadriceps tendon.  Dr. Connie Mariano, Physician to the President during 
Clinton’s presidency, explained that Clinton received a spinal anesthetic prior 
to surgery that “did not affect his consciousness or his cognitive abilities.”55  
She added, “If the president had undergone general anesthesia for this 
surgery, however, I was fully prepared to recommend invoking Section 3 of 
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, which would have allowed the powers and 
duties of the presidency to pass into the hands of Vice President Gore.”56  She 
also indicated that she “had informed Bruce Lindsey, a key presidential 
adviser, that, if the President required general anesthesia, Section 3 should be 
invoked.  As general anesthesia was unnecessary, [she] did not recommend 
its invocation.”57 
The viewpoints expressed by Physicians to the President associated with 
the Reagan and Clinton administrations seem to suggest that blanket 
condemnations of White House physicians for gross insensitivity or for 
cowardice on the issue of presidential disability are unwarranted and unfair.  
After enactment of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment in 1967, members of this 
 
 50. Id. 
 51. See generally Joel K. Goldstein, Vice-Presidential Behavior in a Disability Crisis:  
The Case of Thomas R. Marshall, POL. & LIFE SCI., Fall 2014, at 37 (discussing Grayson’s 
time as Physician to the President and medical cover-ups). 
 52. GILBERT, supra note 44, at 224–25. 
 53. Interview by Stephen F. Knott et al. with John Hutton, former Physician to the 
President 32 (Apr. 15–16, 2004), https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-oral-
histories/john-hutton-md-oral-history-white-house-physician [https://perma.cc/S5KW-
NVDZ].   
 54. Gilbert, supra note 21, at 58–76. 
 55. E. Connie Mariano, In Sickness and in Health:  Medical Care for the President of the 
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group seem to have become much more sensitive to the constitutional 
avenues now available to Presidents in confronting instances of disability and 
much more alert to the opportunities provided by the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment in dealing with them.  A hundred years ago, Woodrow Wilson 
and Dr. Grayson did not have these constitutional advantages since the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment did not exist then and the Constitution was rather 
vague on issues of disability and inability. 
That very vagueness may have made presidential advisers and associates 
of all kinds quite hesitant to recommend that a President step aside to make 
way for a temporary Acting President since the new Acting President may 
not have agreed that his role was only temporary and that he must be willing 
to relinquish his powers with grace and calm whenever the President chose 
to reclaim them.58  More specifically, what would have convinced Woodrow 
Wilson that Vice President Thomas Marshall would have voluntarily 
relinquished his presidential powers when Wilson wanted them to be released 
rather than holding on to them until Wilson’s term had finally run out?  Since 
1967, the answer to this compelling question has been, quite simply, the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment. 
More recently, a group that included former Physicians to the President 
has worked to further enhance the status of Physician to the President in the 
power structure of the White House.  This group, known as the Working 
Group on Presidential Disability, is a body formed in 1994 by the Bowman 
Gray School of Medicine and the Jimmy Carter Presidential Center.59  It 
recommended that “the President appoint a Senior Physician to a position as 
his or her personal physician in the Executive Office of the President.”60  
Further, it recommended that this “Senior Physician” have the responsibility 
of “facilitating the application of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment” and that “the 
Senior White House Physician be accorded a title such as Assistant to the 
President or Deputy Assistant to the President, or equivalent military rank.”61  
These physicians—who have had experience as White House functionaries 
of a very special sort—made these suggestions as a way of increasing the 
status and personal clout of future Physicians to the President so that in any 
subsequent instances involving possible invocations of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment, their advice will be taken very seriously, rather than being 
essentially ignored, by others in the White House chain of command.  All of 
this should suggest that Abrams’s sharp criticisms of Physicians to the 
President as being secretive and untrustworthy cheerleaders for presidential 
continuance in office regardless of health status seem badly outdated.  
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Proposals based on such outdated assumptions should be approached with 
great caution. 
Additional points raised by Dr. Abrams are quite important and deserve 
discussion here.  The first is his provocative remark that a closely divided 
Medical Impairment Panel would not be problematic in resolving issues of 
presidential disability.  Abrams wrote, “Five-to-four decisions of the 
Supreme Court are legion. . . .  But their split decisions have hardly shaken 
the foundations of the republic.”62  He also claimed that “[a]n independent 
body of experts will be objective, will have no conflict of interest, . . . and 
can be depended on not to violate the public trust.”63  These rather grandiose 
pronouncements are highly questionable. 
First, contrary to Abrams’s assertion, closely divided U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions often generate intense conflict and occasional outrage among the 
general population, the political “influentials,” and the states.  For example, 
the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens United v. FEC,64 which saw 
the court vote five to four to strike down limitations on spending by 
corporations in political campaigns, provoked a “firestorm of criticism.”65  
As Mark Alexander writes, “there is a serious democratic tension when one 
constitutional value (speech) gets promoted over another (equality).”66  He 
continues: 
In our modern fund-raising machinery, as candidates and elected officials 
raise money from a small set of elite donors, they are disproportionately 
responsive to the few, not to the many, and not to their constituents.  When 
this occurs, elected officials cannot do their jobs as well, the few have 
concentrated power, the many have diluted power and political equality is 
trampled.67 
So angry were so many at this five-to-four decision that President Barack 
Obama publicly rebuked the Court during his 2010 State of the Union address 
on national television by deliberately denouncing the ruling in the presence 
of the Court’s Justices, several of whom had voted with the majority in the 
case.68 
Three years later, the same Supreme Court, again in a five-to-four decision, 
determined in Windsor v. United States,69 that the Defense of Marriage Act—
enacted by Congress in 1996 to thwart gay marriage—was 
unconstitutional.70  While this decision was seen as a great victory for same-
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sex couples hoping to marry, it provoked a sharp counterattack in several 
states.  The Indiana legislature, for example, enacted a law in 2015 aimed at 
insulating citizens of that state from the “encroachment” of gay rights.  But 
the outcry was so great—not only by gay rights activists but also by 
corporations, the media, and even sports heroes—that the Republican 
Governor, Mike Pence, and the Republican legislature very quickly altered 
the offensive legislation.71  This, of course, further infuriated the state’s 
antigay forces. 
What these experiences signify is rather clear.  Contrary to what Dr. 
Abrams asserted, closely divided Supreme Court decisions frequently enrage 
major segments of the public, particularly when they relate to emotional 
national issues.  It should be easy to imagine, then, the furies that almost 
certainly would be unleashed if a Medical Impairment Panel should issue a 
closely divided “report” recommending that a President should essentially be 
removed from the exercise of the powers and duties to which he or she had 
been duly elected. 
Second, it is unrealistic to expect that Medical Impairment Panel members 
would always be able to present their views about the President in an 
unambiguous, unbiased, nonpartisan, easily understood, and widely accepted 
manner.  In fact, it is not even guaranteed that they would all abide by 
professional standards of personal behavior.  Specifically, in their 
performance as panel members in relation to psychological and psychiatric 
diagnoses, it would appear that psychiatrists can be found on every side of 
psychiatric issues and that the testimony of psychiatric personnel can be 
inaccurate—or even badly tainted and thoroughly untrustworthy. 
As an example, after John Hinckley—in order to show his love for movie 
actress Jodie Foster—shot President Reagan, Press Secretary James Brady, a 
Secret Service agent, and a Washington, D.C., policeman in March 1981 
outside the Washington Hilton Hotel, he was found to be psychologically 
unsound and was subsequently confined to St. Elizabeth’s Psychiatric 
Hospital in Washington, D.C.72  Just a few years after his initial confinement, 
however, Hinckley sought permission to leave the hospital, without any 
supervision whatsoever, for visits with his family.73  When his intention was 
challenged in court, psychiatrists differed greatly in their testimony.  One in 
particular stood out as having a rather unique viewpoint.  Dr. Glenn Miller, a 
well-established psychiatrist, strongly supported unsupervised family 
visits.74  He testified at the time that, in his opinion, the 1981 would-be 
assassin posed no danger to President Reagan, Press Secretary Brady, or 
anyone else.75  Miller also testified that Hinckley showed remorse for what 
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he had done, no longer saw himself as a hero for attempting to kill Reagan, 
and was no longer obsessed with actress Jodie Foster.76 
Although Hinckley’s lawyer had introduced Dr. Miller in the courtroom as 
“a witness who was hired by the hospital as a consultant,” it soon became 
clear to the court—and to the public—that Dr. Miller was on the payroll of 
Hinckley’s wealthy father.77  Thus, his testimony was quickly and widely 
debunked as having been bought and paid for.  Other psychiatrists who gave 
testimony during the Hinckley proceedings (and were unpaid by the wealthy 
Hinckley family) differed sharply from Miller in their views.  They were 
convinced that Hinckley suffered from a severe, chronic mental illness and 
remained dangerous to himself and to others, including Jodie Foster.78  They 
also revealed that President Reagan’s would-be assassin, while hospitalized 
at St. Elizabeth’s, had written several letters to serial killer Ted Bundy, then 
on Florida’s death row.79  Bundy was a kidnapper, rapist, and serial killer 
who confessed to killing at least thirty females in seven states between 1974 
and 1978.80  In 1989, Bundy was executed for his crimes.81  Rather strangely, 
Hinckley had written to Bundy not to question or condemn him for his 
horrific killing spree but rather to express his sorrow about the “awkward 
position Bundy must be in.”82 
These independent psychiatrists also revealed that Hinckley had recently 
corresponded with Squeaky Fromm, who had tried to assassinate President 
Ford in 1975, and had made clear his intention to communicate with 
convicted serial killer Charles Manson.83  Hinckley also had some fifty-seven 
photographs of Jodie Foster in his hospital room—a fact that, in itself, might 
well suggest his continued obsession with the actress.84  Despite this 
obsession, Hinckley had recently become engaged, the “independent” 
psychiatrists informed the court, to a forty-three-year-old woman who was 
found not guilty by reason of insanity for killing her sleeping ten-year-old 
daughter.85  In light of these startling disclosures, the “bought and paid for” 
testimony of Dr. Miller was publicly and decisively repudiated, and 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. Leslie Maitland Werner, Hinckley’s Father Paid for Expert’s Testimony, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 18, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/04/18/us/hinckley-s-father-paid-for-expert-s-
testimony.html [https://perma.cc/LS8R-4UBZ]. 
 78. Leslie Maitland Werner, Request for Hinckley Leave Withdrawn, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
14, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/04/16/us/request-for-hinckley-leave-withdrawn 
.html [https://perma.cc/H2VV-P26S]. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Jon Nordheimer, Bundy Is Put to Death in Florida After Admitting Trail of Killings, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 1989), http://www.nytimes.com/1989/01/25/us/bundy-is-put-to-death-
in-florida-after-admitting-trail-of-killings.html [https://perma.cc/84X2-HE88]. 
 81. Id. 
 82. AP, supra note 75. 
 83. Kenneth B. Noble, Deciding Consequences of Insanity Defense, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 
1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/04/19/weekinreview/deciding-consequences-of-
insanity-defense.html [https://perma.cc/W3WM-N7GG]. 
 84. James Brooke, Hinckley Tries, Again, to Gain Some Freedom, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 
1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/09/30/us/hinckley-tries-again-to-gain-some-freedom 
.html [https://perma.cc/DQ92-NZ9Q]. 
 85. Werner, supra note 77. 
2017] MEDICAL IMPAIRMENT PANELS 1125 
Hinckley’s request for unsupervised departures from his psychiatric hospital 
was rejected for many years thereafter.86 
What if a Standing Medical Impairment Panel was established in the 
United States, as Dr. Abrams suggests, and was investigating the subject of 
possible psychiatric dysfunction on the part of an incumbent President?  A 
dueling band of psychiatrists would then be called upon to offer “objective 
and trustworthy” testimony to the Medical Impairment Panel, rather than 
testimony that was distorted, biased, or shaped by “compensation.”87  Then, 
members of Congress would be charged with carefully weighing the 
objective and trustworthy testimony and taking appropriate action regarding 
a possible invocation of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.  Could this process 
be carried out with certainty of fairness?  Could not future Dr. Millers emerge 
from time to time with their bought-and-paid-for testimony?  Would the 
objectivity, reliability, and professionalism of the process be transparent to 
all?  Or would large segments of the population be convinced that a partisan 
coup was in progress and respond with rage? 
More specifically, suppose that the Republican psychiatrists on the 
Medical Impairment Panel determined that the President of the United States, 
a Democrat, was indeed psychologically ill and should step aside in favor of 
the Vice President?  Suppose, too, that the Democrats on the panel decided 
that the President was wholly well, or at least well enough to remain in 
power?  Since members of Congress would then be offered at least two 
competing, divergent, and eminently “respectable” psychiatric opinions upon 
which to hang their votes, they would be able to subscribe rather easily to 
whatever opinion supported their normal partisan proclivities, while insisting 
that their votes were based on the proffered medical advice and nothing else.  
But, in fact, the medical “theories” thrust onto the public domain in this 
instance may well have been put forward for thoroughly partisan purposes.  
Would, then, the process have been objective, fair, and aimed at the common 
good?  Or would it have represented nothing more than abject partisanship 
dressed cleverly in psychiatric disguise?  Finally, would the American people 
accept the validity of such an obviously partisan process or, rather, take to 
the streets in protest?  In light of the deepening partisan divide in this country 
and the lessened inclination to compromise,88 the answer to each of these 
questions seems clear. 
One final criticism of the Abrams’s proposal deserves attention.  Although 
physicians are generally well trained and often well intentioned, they are also 
fallible human beings with significant limitations.  They are not all-knowing 
gods who should speak to the nation ex cathedra on all medical matters.  
Despite their impressive knowledge base, physicians can, and do, on 
occasion make serious mistakes in their diagnoses and prognoses and should 
not be put in the position of publicly and independently recommending that 
a President step down from the exercise of his powers and duties, whether 
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permanently or temporarily.  Even the best and most extensive training in 
medicine does not lead to medical infallibility, a fact that should prevent 
physicians from publicly “playing god” in terms of presidential health and 
mortality.  A discreet, behind-the-scenes role for medical professionals in 
caring for the president makes eminent good sense; a public role in 
announcing to the world diagnoses, prognoses, and whether the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment should be invoked—as envisioned by the Abrams proposal—
does not. 
B.  The Park Proposal 
Dr. Bert Park, M.D., proposed a rather different plan to achieve regular 
and objective medical assessments of the President’s health status.  He wrote: 
A Presidential Disability Commission, staffed at least in part by physicians 
skilled in disability determination, could be chosen or appointed before the 
inception of the next Administration. . . .  Equally divided by political 
persuasion, such a commission would be charged with monitoring the 
president’s health on a yearly basis and reporting its findings to the vice-
president.89 
Park added that this group “would have no power to initiate proceedings 
against the president, much less to depose him; its duties would be restricted 
to gathering medical facts to assist the vice president in making an informed 
decision should the question of inability arise.”90 
Park, then, would take steps to ensure that there would be an “equal” 
division—by party—of Presidential Disability Commission members.  In my 
view, this is clearly superior to Dr. Abrams’s approach.  Nevertheless, in the 
present badly overheated political environment with contending political 
forces clearly at war with each other,91 the Park proposal would likely result 
in frequent “presidential health confrontations” in which one side would try 
to achieve partisan advantage by disabling (e.g., removing from office) a 
troublesome leader of the opposite party.  Overturning the nation’s election 
returns because of partisan animosity would be harmful to the country’s 
morale and destructive to whomever happened to be serving as the country’s 
legitimately elected leader.  It would also irreparably damage our reputation 
as a nation resting firmly on the bedrock foundations of democracy. 
It is troubling to think that a President of the United States could be 
required by law to submit to annual medical examinations by physicians who 
he does not know and who were nominated, at least in part, by a 
confrontational opposition party in Congress.  By forcing physicians on the 
President, political enemies can violate the President’s privacy rights and his 
freedom to consult his own physicians. 
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In any event, the function of Dr. Park’s commission would be to “gather[] 
medical facts to assist the vice president in making an informed decision 
should the question of inability arise.”92  Dr. Park explained here that, “as the 
amendment expressly states, only the vice president or cabinet can initiate 
any deliberations relevant to a determination of presidential inability.”93  He 
wrote that: 
first, the disability commission would undertake a physical examination, 
supported by appropriate diagnostic tests.  Second, these findings are 
analyzed to determine the nature and extent of the patient’s impaired bodily 
functions.  The third step entails a comparison of the results of that analysis 
with the criteria specified in the [Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent 
Impairment].  That need not be performed by the same physician (or 
physicians) responsible for the initial examination.  The final step in rating 
medical impairment takes into account all relevant considerations in order 
to reach a “whole person” impairment rating on a percentage basis.94 
In a presentation made in support of his proposal in 1995 to members of 
the Working Group on Presidential Disability, a collection of some fifty 
physicians, lawyers, government personnel, and university professors formed 
to study a broad range of disability issues, Dr. Park commented: 
Perhaps some relevant examples from recent history might very quickly 
assist you in understanding what I mean by the term, “percentage 
impairment of the whole person.”  What does that really entail?  With 
regard to the all-importance of brain dysfunction, several factors are 
included in the evaluation of such impairment in the Guides, among them 
disturbances in language, of complex and integrated function such as 
abstraction and emotions, as well as the presence of episodic or permanent 
neurologic deficits.  Now, applying these and other Guides’ criteria to 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt during his last term in office allows one not only 
to substantiate, but also to quantitate, his impairment retrospectively.95 
Park then went on to state that “Roosevelt would have been objectively 
rated from 20–45 percent impaired by 1945.”96  Even if accurate, is it certain 
that this alleged impairment level posed any real problems with regard the 
President’s effectiveness?  Did Park argue that it did?  If so, what is the 
evidence supporting his judgment?  Park stated that by 1945, Roosevelt 
“suffered from congestive heart failure, chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disease, and periods of anemia, all of which may adversely affect brain 
function, and each with its own percentage of impairment as figured in the 
final equation.”97  However, Park’s inclusion of the word “may” in this 
instance suggests rather clearly that such illnesses need not adversely affect 
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brain function.  How, then, can the matter of inability—and its extent—be 
determined? 
Park also asked “would anyone today choose to be led by a president 
certifiably impaired from the standpoint of brain dysfunction approaching 50 
percent of his former self?”98  He answered, “I think not, and certainly not if 
this point were made public at the time.”99 
These statements, however, are rather confusing.  The data presented 
above by Dr. Park of Roosevelt’s impairment level in 1945 fell into a broad 
range of 20 to 45 percent.  What, then, was the actual level of Roosevelt’s 
impairment?  Was it 20 percent?  Was it closer to 45 percent?  Unbiased 
referees might well argue that an 80 percent unimpaired Franklin 
Roosevelt—or even a 55 percent unimpaired one—was fully up to meeting 
his official responsibilities.  In short, Dr. Park’s statistical analysis really has 
little meaning here because it is so broad, so indefinite, and tells us so little 
about Roosevelt’s actual performance in office.  Even a 50 percent impaired 
leader might have superior leadership skills compared to his wholly 
unimpaired, but thoroughly inexperienced, replacement. 
In this regard, it might be useful to note that many Americans—and many 
Americans in leadership positions—may well have preferred the charismatic 
Roosevelt to remain in the White House at that time of world conflagration 
rather than confront the prospect of a new, untried, and untested Commander 
in Chief.  Thus, Greenstein suggests that Roosevelt’s “temperament could 
scarcely have been better suited for inspiring public confidence. . . .  Even if 
the sense of absolute assurance he radiated was only that of a masterful 
performer, it reveals his singular emotional fitness for the demands of his 
times.”100 
The power of Roosevelt’s leadership was often in evidence as late as 1944 
and even early into 1945.  Consider a memorandum that he sent to Secretary 
of State Cordell Hull in January 1944, little more than a year before his death, 
in response to a question about Indochina that Hull had raised.101  It suggests 
that Roosevelt, although ill, was quite clear headed, rather perceptive, and 
very much in command: 
I saw Halifax last week and told him quite frankly that it was perfectly 
true that I had, for over a year, expressed the opinion that Indo-China should 
not go back to France but that it should be administered by an international 
trusteeship.  France has had the country—thirty million inhabitants for 
nearly one hundred years, and the people are worse off than they were at 
the beginning. 
As a matter of interest, I am wholeheartedly supported in this view by 
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and by Marshal Stalin.  I see no reason to 
play in with the British Foreign Office in this matter.  The only reason they 
seem to oppose it is that they fear the effect it would have on their own 
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possessions and those of the Dutch.  They have never liked the idea of 
trusteeship because it is, in some instances, aimed at future independence.  
This is true in the case of Indo-China. 
Each case must, of course, stand on its own feet, but the case of Indo-
China is perfectly clear.  France has milked it for one hundred years.  The 
people of Indo-China are entitled to something better than that.102 
In her study of Roosevelt’s ill health, Rose McDermott concluded that 
[b]ecause this condition manifested intermittently, it did not impact all his 
decisions and actions.  Most notably, it appears not to have affected 
Roosevelt’s performance at Yalta. . . .  Roosevelt managed to secure the 
two things he cared about most:  Soviet agreement to the United Nations 
and its future cooperation in the war against Japan.103 
Jay Winik offered strong support for this analysis when he noted that, at 
Yalta, 
Roosevelt was, despite his physical frailty, a towering figure still in 
command.  He presided over each plenary session and made sure that the 
major topics were addressed. . . .  Roosevelt obtained Stalin’s promise to 
enter the Pacific war no later than ninety days after the surrender of 
Germany, in exchange for control of parts of Manchuria after Japan 
surrendered.  Second among the president’s principal goals was securing 
an agreement for the establishment of the United Nations, which would be 
an international framework for peace.104 
Crispell and Gomez contribute their insights to this discussion by adding 
this important point:  “FDR’s condition varied sharply from day to day . . . 
[but] he always picked up and bounced back quickly . . . [and] his inner 
vitality, even though weakened, was so radiant that, after a few moment’s 
talk, he could make almost any visitor completely forget that he seemed 
ill.”105 
On April 2, 1945, Roosevelt again seemed very much in command when 
he sent a fiery message to Soviet leader Josef Stalin.  It was a message that 
demonstrated his continued and quite powerful involvement in affairs of 
state: 
It would be one of the great tragedies of history if at the very moment of 
victory now within our grasp, such distrust, such lack of faith should 
prejudice the entire undertaking after the colossal losses of life, material, 
and treasure involved.  Frankly, I cannot avoid a feeling of bitter resentment 
toward your informants, whoever they are, for such vile misrepresentations 
of my actions or those of my trusted subordinates.106 
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From reading his angry words, few would imagine that ten days later, 
Roosevelt would be dead and Truman would be President.  On learning of 
this transition, General Eisenhower, U.S. commander in Europe, commented 
that on the night that Roosevelt died, he “went to bed depressed and sad.”107 
While Park’s analysis of Roosevelt is surely provocative, it is incomplete 
and raises more questions than it answers.  First, is it certain that Roosevelt’s 
alleged 1944 to 1945 impairment levels posed any problems whatsoever with 
regard to his effectiveness?  What evidence supports this view?  More 
specifically, assuming that Park is correct that Roosevelt was 45 percent 
“impaired” from 1944 to 1945, did the President’s impairment result in poor 
leadership?  If so, examples should be provided to make Park’s points 
meaningful.  Today, many believe that Roosevelt remained an alert, shrewd, 
and articulate leader to the end, despite his frequent mood swings and 
operation below the peak level of performance shown earlier in his term.108  
The President tried to compensate for his waning strength by allowing some 
of his powers to shift to aides, but he typically remained in charge.109  
Franklin Roosevelt is still widely seen as “the most influential leader in the 
United States in the twentieth century.”110  This might well suggest that Dr. 
Park’s overall analysis—which strongly links his proposal for a Medical 
Impairment Panel to a single case study of Roosevelt’s 1944 to 1945 health 
status—is inadequate and incomplete. 
In Dr. Park’s remarks before the Working Group on Presidential Disability 
in 1995, he made several comments about the Vice President that deserve 
discussion.  He commented, for example, that 
[t]he experiences of Chester A. Arthur and Thomas Riley Marshall during 
the respective disabilities of their immediate superiors has shown that, 
though the cabinet may be willing to hear that a president is disabled, a 
squeamish vice president . . . might choose to abstain.  As a result, a 
disabled president would remain in office. In fact, this is what occurred 
following the attempt to assassinate Reagan.111 
Certainly, the assassination attempt against President Reagan strongly 
suggests the complexity of invocations of Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment.  Although Reagan was severely wounded by the shot fired at 
him by John Hinckley, Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment was not 
invoked, possibly because the President was too severely incapacitated by his 
gunshot wound to invoke it, at least after losing consciousness at the hospital.  
Although Section 4 of the Amendment provides an alternative route to a 
transfer of presidential power, it was also not used.  Vice President Bush was 
not in Washington at the time and did not arrive there until early that 
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evening.112  Ironically, Reagan’s Chief of Staff was then Jim Baker, a 
moderate Republican and very close friend of the Vice President who had 
also coordinated the Vice President’s 1980 presidential campaign.  Because 
of his well-known friendship with Bush, Baker likely felt uncomfortable in 
recommending invocation of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the Reagan 
loyalists.113 
Understandably, the Chief of Staff reasoned that Reagan’s other aides—
and perhaps Reagan himself—might have seen any suggestion of invocation 
by Baker as a sign of disloyalty to the president or as an act of excessive 
loyalty to Bush.114  Therefore, although he mentioned the possibility of 
invocation to Reagan’s other aides,115 Baker simply did not recommend it.  
It is worth noting, however, that Richard Allen, another Reagan aide, had 
convened a meeting of the Cabinet in the White House situation room that 
day, both to keep Cabinet members up to date on what was happening and to 
have them available if it did become necessary to invoke the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment.116 
In the matter of invocations of Sections 3 and 4 of the Amendment, all 
Vice Presidents are likely to tread very carefully.  The appearance of being 
too eager to become Acting President might well end their careers.  In 1981, 
Bush was wise to be measured and cautious in his behavior in response to the 
assassination attempt.  Since Reagan’s doctors were highly optimistic that 
the President would recover from his wound, Bush was understandably 
reticent to become too prominent in events.117  This can be seen in the fact 
that he wisely refused to land in a helicopter on the White House lawn—as 
he had been urged to do—since such behavior is “reserved” for the 
President.118 
Bush’s refusal to become too prominent in events after Reagan was shot 
was well rewarded.  Eight years later, he was nominated for the presidency 
by the Republican party and then elected to that office with Reagan’s active 
support.119  He might never have attained these goals had he appeared too 
ambitious, too assertive, or too grandiose on the day that Reagan was shot. 
Dr. Park raised three final points that deserve discussion.  First, he wrote 
that, “[a]s regards the three instances of presidential inability during 
Reagan’s tenure, it bears re-emphasizing that one individual was largely 
responsible in each case for withholding the application of the Twenty-fifth 
Amendment.”120  He then named the three individuals to whom he referred:  
presidential aide Richard Darman in 1981, Reagan himself in 1985, and Chief 
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of Staff Howard Baker in 1987.121  What “that dubious legacy suggests,” 
Park noted, “is the need to seek a second opinion from someone other than 
‘official sources.’”122 
Park is correct that Richard Darman played an active role in the decision 
not to invoke the disability provision of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment in 
1981.123  However, Darman did not have the power to determine on his own 
authority that Section 3 would not be invoked.124  As previously discussed, 
Chief of Staff Jim Baker was rather neutralized as a source of power on that 
particular occasion because of his closeness to Vice President Bush.  This 
meant that a person who should have played a key role in considering 
invocation of Section 3 had not done so, leaving a subordinate (Darman) to 
push hard and effectively for noninvocation.125  Nevertheless, the ultimate 
decision was not Darman’s alone but rather the consensus view of Reagan’s 
key lieutenants. 
Influential counselor Ed Meese’s view was that President Reagan “had not 
surrendered his authority” and was still, therefore, in command.126  Meese 
expressed satisfaction with a continuation of this arrangement.  Baker came 
to support Meese’s viewpoint and did so firmly.  They agreed, therefore, that 
invoking the Amendment would be “premature.”127  And Vice President 
Bush reinforced their position substantially when he told cabinet members 
on the night of the shooting:  “The President is still President . . . .  He is not 
incapacitated and I am not going to be a substitute President.  I’m here to sit 
in for him while he recuperates.  But he’s going to call the shots.”128  It is 
clear, therefore, that Darman’s viewpoint on noninvocation was shared 
widely by other powerful players; it was certainly not his alone. 
With regard to 1985, it is quite unclear what Dr. Park meant when he 
referred to Reagan’s “withholding” invocation of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment.  Reagan did not withhold invocation that year.  He invoked 
Section 3, in fact, just prior to undergoing surgery for colon cancer.129  
Although Reagan’s comments at the time of invocation were somewhat 
unclear, invocation of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment was the only mechanism 
in existence—short of resignation—by which he could constitutionally pass 
on his powers and duties to Vice President Bush.130  Therefore, he must have 
invoked Section 3.  In his 1990 autobiography, Reagan stated explicitly that 
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he had, in fact, done so.131  He wrote, “Before they wheeled me into the 
operating room, I signed a letter invoking the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 
making George Bush acting president during the time I was incapacitated 
under anesthesia.”132 
Concerning the decision not to invoke the Amendment in 1987, the issue 
of inability arose again late in Reagan’s second term.  One of the President’s 
aides, James Cannon, complained to Howard Baker, the President’s newest 
Chief of Staff, that Reagan seemed “inattentive at Cabinet meetings” and that 
many staffers speculated he preferred to spend his time in the White House 
residence rather than work.133  However, after meeting on several occasions 
with Reagan, Baker became convinced that the President was emerging from 
a period of lethargy, likely related to the devastating Iran-Contra scandal, in 
which he had approved the “arms for hostages” arrangement with Iran shortly 
after undergoing major surgery for colon cancer.134  The independent 
counsel’s investigation of Iran-Contra led to eleven convictions of top 
administration aides.135  The scandal quite conceivably could have brought 
down the Reagan presidency.136  Reagan’s reemergence, in Baker’s view, 
saw him much more “involved” and much more assertive, thus making 
invocation of the Amendment unnecessary.137 
The second major point Dr. Park raises is the question, “how has the 
present system of impairment determination fared today when applied to 
executives of major corporations and the like?”138  He responds to his own 
question by writing: 
Independent clinical studies substantiate that . . . permanent impairment can 
be rated with reasonable accuracy, uniformity, and dispatch.  In essence, 
the machinery for such determination has been in place since 1971 and has 
worked well.  It would seem, then, no great leap of principle to extend the 
practice to the workings of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.139 
The problem with Park’s assessment, however, is that there are 
extraordinarily significant differences between executives of major 
corporations and Presidents of the United States.  The “removal for cause” of 
a corporate leader is generally seen as a private matter—one that is handled 
by a corporate board of directors.140  Board members choose and appoint the 
corporate leader themselves, typically without major input from shareholders 
or anyone else outside the corporate board.141  The President of the United 
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States, however, is chosen for his position by an electoral college that is now 
“elected” by some 130 million voters in the fifty states, Washington, D.C., 
and overseas.142  The difference between these two processes is so great that 
no “leap of faith” could justify extending the very private processes of the 
corporate world to the broadly transparent public domain. 
Third, Dr. Park recommended that on questions of possible disability in 
Presidents of the United States, “a second opinion” should be sought apart 
from the opinions of White House aides.143  This second opinion, of course, 
would come from members of his proposed Medical Impairment Panel.144  
However, a superior suggestion, in my view, would be to draw this “second 
opinion” from the senior and associate White House Physicians to the 
President rather than from a board of examiners outside the White House who 
likely have never before met the President, have never before seen him except 
on their television screens, and are complete strangers to him, as he is to them. 
Over time, Physicians to the President become close to the President.  
Their office is in the White House itself, close to his; they typically see the 
President regularly, perhaps even several times a day; they speak with him 
often; thus, they come to know the President and know him rather well.  In 
return, he knows them and likely trusts them.  This intimate relationship 
between the President and his doctors is quite important and should be put to 
good advantage.  Who better to give medical advice about (and to) the 
President than the doctors who know and treat him intimately and over time?  
Also, their evaluation would be much better accepted by the President and by 
much of the country. 
CONCLUSION 
At the final session of the Working Group on Presidential Disability on 
December 3, 1996, Dr. Park highlighted his remarks in favor of a “Standing 
Presidential Impairment Panel” by stating: 
What I, therefore, would hope to represent as the finished product of our 
deliberations is some suggested wording for a concurrent resolution to be 
considered by Congress that designates the composition of this consultative 
body and specifies the method and prospective timing of its selection.  Not 
only would such expertise strengthen the mandate of the White House 
physician, it would provide for that necessary second opinion that the 
American public deserves.145 
Not surprisingly, Dr. Abrams strongly supported Park’s “motion” but 
neither man saw his hopes realized.  At this concluding session, the Park-
Abrams motion supporting creation of a Standing Medical Impairment Panel 
to monitor the President’s health and report on it to relevant officials was 
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overwhelmingly rejected by group members.146  The vote was 17 percent in 
favor and 83 percent opposed.147  In this “election,” I voted with the majority 
and have explained the reasons for my “no” vote in this paper and elsewhere.  
In the intervening years, I have never regretted my vote or changed my mind 
on the issues that shaped it. 
A medical commission, as proposed by either Dr. Abrams or Dr. Park, 
however well intentioned they both may have been, would damage 
unacceptably the professional reputation of Presidents of the United States 
and, at the same time, weaken greatly Presidents’ ability to lead.  Because of 
the systems of separation of powers and checks and balances given to us by 
the framers of the Constitution, Presidents are already checked and balanced 
by our political institutions (e.g., Congress and the courts) to a notable 
degree; they are checked and balanced by the media as well.  The first several 
months of the Trump administration have strongly illustrated this point, and 
President Trump has certainly tweeted vociferously of his displeasure in 
response.148  But while these restraining mechanisms are useful in our 
political system, too many “checks and balances” on Presidents, including 
those suggested by Drs. Abrams and Park, make for a dangerously weakened 
and continually threatened chief executive.  In my view, we should say “no” 
to such suggestions. 
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